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OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
HISTORICAL PAMPHLET SERIES

Monograph Number 6

by



May 1976

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PERSONNEL HISTORICAL PAMPHLET SERIES

(Compiled as Ready Reference and Training Aid for Management Use)

Monograph
Number 6

SUBJECT: Manpower Planning and Control, Selection Out.

Prepared By

[REDACTED]

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From

OP-10 Personnel Administration, An Overview, 1946-68

Personnel Administration in a Time of Change, An Overview
1969-75

OP-8 CIA Recruitment, 1947-71 by [REDACTED]

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OP-9 Office of Personnel, The Position Management and Compensation
Division, 1946-67 by [REDACTED]

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OP-14 Personnel Placement in CIA, 1946-71 [REDACTED]
and [REDACTED]

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OP-11 Personnel Records and Reports, The Control Division
Office of Personnel, 1947-71 by [REDACTED]

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OP Oral History Project

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FOREWORD

The arrangement of the Monograph is similar to those that went before. Parts I, II and III are highlights arranged chronologically. Part IV is excerpted from the Oral History and arranged by topic; Part V contains the appendices.

Like love and marriage, manpower planning and control go together, or should. Organizationally the subject is a large one involving line management, several parts of the Office of Personnel, the Comptroller, and top management. This study is mainly concerned with the Office of Personnel portion of the responsibility which is usually quite delimited. Ceilings, for example, are established either by the Director of Central Intelligence or by higher authority such as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in accordance with Administration policy. Once the pie is sliced between the four Directorates, the Deputies take over from their level on down.

Within the policy framework for manpower planning and control as established by top management, the work of reporting, of forecasting requirements, of analyzing attrition and available supply, of recommending promotion rates and retirement policies required to maintain flow in the system, or maintaining control over the numbers entering on duty, all these functions are the responsibility of the Director of Personnel and his Office.

The division of labor, plus the dynamic nature of manpower and its integration with programming and budgeting, make manpower the most difficult of all resources to plan and control. Some of the difficulties can be appreciated by taking a look at the Agency as it appears to the planner:

Not one organization but a confederation of 5 Career Services and 21 service designations by which our people are managed.

A dichotomy in which ceiling allocations and position management functions are handled on an organization rather than a career service basis.

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A sizable group of employees distributed throughout the world in a variety of guises and attached to organizations which in turn have their own peculiar problems and ways of doing things.

13 other categories of employees in addition to the all important U.S. Staff Employee category.

A U.S. Staff Employee work force in which hundreds of skills and professions are practiced, many of which are further complicated by language, area knowledge and cover skills.

Numerous pressures and influences (not necessarily bad) within a tight network of security each interested in shaping objectives to achieve a particular end, e.g. the Comptroller and fiscal management.


An organization which in the beginning experienced severe growing pains only to be brought to a screaming halt by administrative freeze; and one which has endured the same process on a reduced scale at least twice since that time. Agency strength today (1976) is at the point it was in 1956 -- twenty years ago.

Another way the manpower planner looks at the Agency is in broader groupings necessary as a starting point in the planning, later to be spelled out in specifics: These are the major occupational groupings.

General Administrative, Clerical
and Office Services Group.....

Intelligence and Social Sciences....

Physical Scientists and Engineers...



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If all this seems excessively statistical and not people orientated, the impression is correct. Manpower planning and control has to do primarily with

* A complete break-out by occupational groupings, as of 30 December 1975, is included at Appendix F. Another and more common grouping is in terms of four major categories, professional [redacted] Technical [redacted] Clerical [redacted] and Misc. [redacted]

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manpower economics; and yet, no field of personnel activity can have as much effect on employee motivation, advancement, assignment, as careful and thoughtful manpower planning

A final word of caution to the researcher.

The subject of this Monograph, Manpower Planning and Control, and Selection Out, does not divide neatly into the Monograph categories. You are therefore advised to check Monograph Number 5, Subject: "Selection of Personnel for Initial Assignment, Promotion, including the OP Placement Function," published in March 1976. Placement Division, later the Staff Personnel Division, controlled the entrance on duty of new employees in relation to ceilings.

Monograph Number 3 should also be checked, Subject: Position Management, Classification, Compensation, Salary and Wage Administration, 1949-74 published in May 1975. This monograph contains, among other topics, the OP role in the administration of super-grade positions and people.

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

CONTENTS

		<u>Pages</u>
<u>Part I</u>	1951-1959 First Efforts to Estimating Requirements, 1953 Freeze; Efforts to Balance Ceiling and Tables of Organization; Monthly Personnel Statistical Review Initiated, 1953; Statistical Reporting Branch (SRB)OP Established 1954; Study of Proposed Retirement System, 1958; Manpower Control System Introduced, 1958; Retirement Policy Established, 1959; A Manpower Control Program for the Clandestine Services, including Regulation 701, 1959.	1-11
<u>Part II</u>	The 1960's The 701 Program Implemented 1961; Management Staff (and Position Control Function) Abolished, 1961; Flexible T/O and CSGA Survived Elimination of Manpower Control System, 1961; Kirkpatrick Task Force Recommended 'Up or Out' Policy, 1962; Supergrade Expansion as Solution to Manpower Problem, 1962; MANS Code and Reporting System Introduced, 1965; Advance Staffing Plan, 1966; Age 60 Retirement Formally Announced, 1966; BALPA, 1968; Vietnam Expansion, '67-68; Manpower Reduction Program Initiated, 1969.	12-27
<u>Part III</u>	The 1970's Advance Staffing Plan to Placement, Staff Personnel Division, FY'70; OPRED Succeeds BALPA, FY'70; Manpower Reductions of 5% Per Annum Achieved by Retirements, FY'71; Government Wide Cuts in Strength and Average Grade Imposed, FY'72; The Schlesinger Slash, FY'73; Common Manpower Planning and Personnel Management Approach Adopted by new DCI, PDP, PASG, APP, FY'74; Increase in Average Grade, FY'70 to '75.	28-33

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

CONTENTS

PART IV, Excerpts from Oral History Tapes

	<u>Page</u>
A. <u>William J. Kelly</u> : Control An Early Problem, Personnel Statistics in the Late Forties	37
B. <u>George E. Meloon</u> and [REDACTED]: The Requirements Boom of the Early Fifties, the OPC Story	38-40
C. <u>Lawrence K. White</u> : The First Ceiling (1952) and How it Came About	41
D. [REDACTED]: The Manpower Control Program of 1959, the Career Service Ceiling, the CSGA	42-45
E. <u>Gordon M. Stewart</u> : How He Turned the Rationale for Early Retirement Around and Launched the Controversial 701 Program of Selection Out	46-47
F. <u>Emmett Echols</u> : Implementing the 701 Program and Results of Same	48-51
G. <u>Robert S. Wattles</u> : Lack of Advance Manpower Planning, the Coming of Automated Data Processing, Placement Role	52-53
H. <u>Harry B. Fisher</u> : Handling of Gradual Reductions, 1971-72 . The Schlesinger Slash. How the Cuts Were Made	54-57
I. [REDACTED] The All Chiefs and No Indians Syndrome in the Cut-backs	58-60
J. [REDACTED] Manpower Planning in the Wake of the 1973 Cuts	61-62
K. [REDACTED] Gaps in Manpower Planning	63-64
L. [REDACTED] Manpower and Personnel Planning as Directed by Wm. E. Colby. The Need for Economic Type Modeling of the Personnel System	65-67

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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1


S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

PART V. Appendices

Page

A.





25X1

69-73

B. Comparison of Optimum and Projected
CSCS Age Distribution (CS-Clandes-
tine Services) Males GS-9 and above.
(The Hump Chart)

74

C. Retirement Chronology, 1947-68. Re-
tirement Rationale (Appendix A of
OP-4 The Development of Retirement
Policy in the CIA, 1947-68 by 


75-82

25X1

D. Office of Personnel, Computer Pro-
duced Reports Handled by Statistical
Reporting Branch as of 22 September
1970.

83-85

E. Annual Personnel Plan Coverages -
FY 74/75

86

F. Distribution of Agency Personnel by
Occupational Categories, as of 31
December 1975

87

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

Part 1 Manpower Planning and Control, Selection
Out. 1951-1959

1951, July Manpower planning was limited at first to the attempts by the Office of Personnel to find out how many and what kinds of people OP would be required to recruit in the immediate future. Lag time was a major problem so guesstimates were usually based on nine months to a year ahead.

For example, George E. Meloon's first move on taking office as Acting Director of Personnel in July 1951 was to press for an enlarged T/O for the Office of Personnel due to anticipated requirements. Meloon estimated that approximately [] new clerical employees would be required in fiscal year 1952, and that it would be necessary to recruit for approximately [] vacancies in executive, administrative, professional and technical categories. Recruitment had top priority some [] positions were planned for it. Some augmentation of the processing units was allowed in immediate support of recruitment.*

July 1951 was also marked by the submission to the DCI** of Col Matthew Baird's paper, A Proposal to Establish and Implement a Career Corp in the CIA. The JOT/CT program subsequently led to a form of manpower planning in that entrance quotas were set by the year on the basis of long term requirements. The process was not a very scientific one and usually led to wrangling between the Office of Training and the Office of Personnel about recruiting shortfalls on a somewhat shaky guesstimate of requirements, averaging about [] individuals a year for the first decade.

* OP-10, Personnel Administration, An Overview, 1946-68, pp. 83-85
**General Walter Bedell Smith

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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

1952, January (First Personnel Ceiling and Freeze Imposed by the DCI)

General Bedell Smith, the DCI, asked at a staff meeting how many people were in next years (FY 53) budget. The answer was given by his newly appointed Assistant Deputy Director, Administration, Col L. K. White, as []
 Upon learning of this figure, the DCI response was "When you have half the number on board, stop recruiting."*
 When informed that the actual strength at the time was [] (round numbers) with some [] in the pipeline, General Smith approved Col White's recommendation for a [] personnel ceiling.

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1953, January (Start of 2 year effort to balance T/O's and Ceiling)

Agency T/O's in 1952 were, in the main, planning documents of doubtful validity. For Example, when the Director imposed the freeze on people at the [] level, Agency T/O positions totaled more than []. The discrepancy between T/O and strength led to loose management enabling line officials to make the decision as to which position was vacant on an ad hoc basis when the employment decision was made. The situation became intolerable to top management in the 1953-54 period when the Agency, by now a large organization, was faced with central manpower controls and allocation of resources. The attempt was therefore made to reconcile strength and T/O's. The hitherto harmless Table of Organization suddenly threatened to become a control document governing just about every personnel action - be it appointment, assignment, transfer or promotion. Personnel administration, through the job classification function, played a highly visible part in the change and in administering the shock. A storm of criticism arose most of it directed at the Office of Personnel and its Director as being old line and inflexible. The Management Staff which determined numbers and organization somehow escaped the head, good management possibly. The storm did not abate until the controversial and capable George E. Meloon resigned in 1955.

*As stated by Col. L. K. White in a 5 March 1971 interview for the OP Oral History Project, Tape 9

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

1953, January Monthly Personnel Statistical Review Initiated

As of 31 January 1953, the first of a series of Monthly Statistical Reviews was prepared, a report which continued for 18 years. The MSPR's were broken down to Office level and summarized on a Directorate level, with an overall Agency summarization. They included, in addition to personnel strength, related statistics on accessions, separations, promotions, applicants in process, grade distribution of on-duty strength and the like.*

*OP-11 Personnel Records and Reports, Control Division, Office of Personnel, 1947-71 p. 46

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

1954, May: The Statistical Reporting Branch (SRB), OP was established on 29 May 1954. Its functions were defined as the preparation, analysis, and presentation of comprehensive personnel statistical reports and data pertaining to the Agency's current T/O positions, strength, ceilings, grade distribution, separations, reassignments, turnover rates, promotions, promotion rates, and such other personnel reports and statistical data as may be required or requested by Agency officials. From this date forward, SRB was the source of manpower planning and control data, particularly the latter. Organizationally, SRB has been shifted several times in the OP hierarchy. Throughout these shifts it has maintained particularly close relations with the Office of the Director of Personnel (OD/Pers) and Plans Staff (formerly the Plans and Review Staff) the Position Management and Compensation Division.**

From Electric Accounting Machines (EAM) to first generation computer (RCA 501 systems) 1961, (RCA 301) 1962; to second RCA Spectra 70-45 was added June 1967, to third generation (IBM 360). Statistical Reporting Branch has supplied back-up data for the Agency's Manpower Planning and Control Systems.

Reporting was at first limited to U.S. Staff employees. Later in 1954 Staff Agents were added and then in the late 1960's contract agents (full time) were added, as ceilings became more inclusive.

*OP-11 Personnel Records and Reports, Control Division, Office of Personnel, 1947-71 pp. 26-56

**Appendix shows some 709 computer and manually prepared reports issued in September 1970. Fifty-five of these had to do with manpower control.

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1956, December: T/O and Strength Discrepancy

After a period of stabilization in 1953-54, Agency strength began to climb again. There were [] on duty in December 1954; [] in December 1955; and [] in December 1956. Separation rates for the Agency as a whole continued to hover just above the ten percent mark (per annum). The clerical portion of this rate was closer to 30 percent. So that of the [] persons recruited to reach these strength figures about half were clericals. Such manpower planning as existed was based largely on replacing clerical losses. The discrepancy between T/O positions and people continued to plague central personnel administration. T/O positions exceeded on-board count on the order of [] complicating the questions of just what constituted a vacancy from a manpower planning standpoint.

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S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

1958, Jan-June

Study of Proposed Retirement System

OP, Statistical Reporting Branch was called on to assist in a study of a proposed CIA Early Retirement System. Overseas Questionnaires, Form 1451 were sent to each Agency employee then on duty, and returned to SRB for coding and production of rosters. Lists were then prepared by Career Service and by years of Federal Service and by age groups showing (1) people who were qualified to retire under the early retirement system (2) those who were not qualified (3) those who might qualify. Using the so called Ellsworth formula (at least fifty years of age with 20 years of Federal Service, 10 years of which were with the Agency, five of the latter being served overseas) percentages were computed of projected eligibles who would qualify for early retirement assuming a total population of [] SRB working with the Plans Staff, OP provided projection figures based on five year age groups and on a year to year basis up through 1973 for males, females and by career service. These figures and other backup data were sent to the Wyatt Company which did the actuarial studies on costs.* These studies represented a new kind of manpower planning for the Agency, one which involved out-flow. They made possible the CIA Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS) of 1964.

*OP-11 Personnel Records and Reports: Control Division, Office of Personnel, 1947-1971 by []

[] pp. 56-58

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

1958, May:

Early Fore-Runner of the Advance Staffing Plan
As part of his response to the paper, 'Role of the Director of Personnel' Gordon M. Stewart stated that, in the future, policies, procedures and responsibilities for the recruitment of personnel were to be based on anticipated requirements - rather than on vacancies*-- Requirements were to be developed by the Career Services and approved by the Director of Personnel. This early forerunner of the Advance Staffing Plan, developed eight years later in 1966, was not successful. Early efforts at manpower planning and forecasting of requirements fell short largely because budget and program planning were done on an organizational basis. It was not until advance personnel planning was integrated with the budget cycle and prepared by the components with the assistance of the Office of Personnel that it became viable. The same dichotomy spelled the doom of the career service ceiling as a means of manpower control, although it was successful, by means of the Career Service Grade Authorization (CSGA), in setting the outer limites on promotion possibilities.**

* The practice of recruiting against vacancies had, by 1958, reached an impasse. Trying to stay within ceilings while encountering lag time of nine months turned recruiting into a brush fire operation, prevented the Recruiting Division from taking advantage of seasonal recruiting opportunities and rendered advance planning impossible. Advance planning of requirements was one means of improvement. Another was organizational. Recruitment was made a part of the newly organized Personnel Operations Division giving unified direction to the requirement, recruitment, placement and follow-up activity, in theory at least.

**OP-10, Personnel Administration, An Overview, 1946 p. 113

S E C R E T

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14 November 1958: Agency's Manpower Control System Introduced
Over two years after it was introduced into the Office of Communications on a pilot basis, the Agency's Manpower Control System was formally adopted with the publication of [] Ceiling and Position Authorization. Featured in the regulation and handbook were the Career Service Staffing Authorization (CSSA), identification on the T/O of positions in terms of the Career Service responsible for staffing them, the Planning Paper for the coming fiscal year which was a listing of positions by occupational code and title, service designation of positions, designation of limited and flexible positions. The Career Service Ceiling was the allocation made by the Deputy Director concerned to the Heads of the Career Services. A delineation of the Staffing Complement and the Development Complement was also required, as was the identification of positions in terms of the Career Service responsible for staffing them. For the preparation of the Career Service Staffing Authorization (CSSA) the Director of Personnel was to furnish the component with a number of positions and organizational location included in approved Planning Papers, number of designees to the Career Service by grade, grade distribution of development complement space, average attrition rates by grade, average promotion rate by grade.

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In order for the various career services to comply with [] SRB provided to the Salary and Wage Division statistical data on each Career Service, reflecting all the changes in grades during calendar year 1959 (initial report), showing the number of reassignments in and out, accessions, separations, promotions, and demotions. These statistics were prepared quarterly at first and then on an end of fiscal year basis. *

* OP-10 Personnel Administration in CIA, An Overview, 1946-68 pp 118-125. For a description of what is left of the Manpower Control program (in 1975) see excerpt from Tape 47, [] [] Part IV, I. p. 58.

25X1

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

1959, February Average Grade Controls Adopted

CIA Notice (Personnel), [] established average grade controls for the Career Services requiring the component to lower a grade if it wanted to raise a grade. The Notice was the result of several C/SWD memos to D/Pers about the ever increasing grade levels in proposed T/O's -- and of increasing pressure by the Bureau of the Budget. The principle followed was that no increase in average grade would be permitted without the permission of the DD himself. The upward tendency continued however until the Bureau of the Budget got into the picture in 1964.

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

1959, April: Retirement Policy Established

Even in the days of wild expansion there was a kind of 'gut' feeling among Agency officials that CIA needed a retirement policy different to that of the Civil Service. Early attempts mainly by [] to recommend policies similar to the F.B.I. and other law enforcement were rejected by Agency management on the basis that the CIA had no domestic law enforcement responsibilities. The 'Up and Out' policies of the military and the Foreign Service, as recommended by the Inspector General, were also rejected as too arbitrary and counter-productive. Probably Gordon Stewart as Director of Personnel (1957-60) was the first one to bring the subject out of the closet. A bill was introduced on 21 March 1957 providing for early retirement and other benefits for Agency personnel which never got out of the pertinent committee.

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Under the spur of the surplus problem and of Stewart's prompting, legislative proposals were reviewed and a statistical manpower planning approach, based on the needs of the Agency rather than the individual, succeeded finally in getting CIA retirement policy and legislation on a new and eventually successful track.

In April 1959, the Retirement Board concept was introduced to the Career Council and adopted nine months later in January 1960. Employees were encouraged to retire when eligible* and supervisors were instructed to refer eligible cases to the Retirement Board for action. In November 1961 Agency retirement policy as stated above was published in [] Each Deputy was allowed to determine the policy for his Directorate. The DDI, Robert Amory, was openly defiant in introducing what to him were 'DDP policies'.**

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* Age 60 with 20 years of service, 62 with at least five, and 55 with 30 years. (Annuity reduced by one percent a year for each year below sixty for latter) Retirements were considered 'voluntary'.

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** In addition to Overview History, account is based on OP-1 History of Retirement Counselling and Placement Staff by [] Reluctant Retirees OP-2 by [], and OP-4 the Development of Retirement Policy in the CIA, 1947 by []

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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

S E C R E T

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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

1959, December A Manpower Control Program for the Clandestine Services

A Manpower Control Program for the Clandestine Services, 6 November 1959, [redacted] famous report on the age-grade hump among CS officers, was sponsored by the D/Pers (Stewart). The Report had more to do with people than with positions but sought to establish an optimum curve for both positions and people. The Report furnished the rationale for the CIA Retirement and Disability Act (CIARDS) of 1964, for the mandatory age sixty retirement policy and specifically for Regulation [redacted], Separation and [redacted] Procedures, which were attached to the Report.

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The Report stated in part, that the Clandestine Services Career Service will not be able to maintain its present level of operational activity unless steps are taken to provide for the recruitment into it annually of a substantial number of young officers and for their advancement at a reasonable rate... To be able to promote them, a means must be found to effect separations among personnel occupying medium and higher grades annually... Attrition does not at present accomplish this nor will it in the future.*

* OP-10, Personnel Administration, An Overview, 1946-68 p. 116

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

Page

PART II

The 1960's. The 701 Program Implemented 1961; Management Staff (and Position Control Function) Abolished, 1961; Flexible T/O and CSGA Survived Elimination of Manpower Control System, 1961; Kirkpatrick Task Force Recommended 'Up or Out' Policy, 1962; Supergrade Expansion as Solution to Manpower Problem, 1962; MANS Code and Reporting System Introduced, 1965; Advance Staffing Plan, 1966; Age 60 Retirement Formally Announced, 1966; BALPA, 1968; Vietnam Expansion, '67-68; Manpower Reduction Program Initiated, 1969.

12-27

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

1961, February The 701 Program

The reduction in force program was officially adopted with the issuance of Agency Regulation [] on 10 February 1961 some nine months after Gordon Stewart left office as Director of Personnel. The long range manpower planning and control aspect of the original proposal, the so-called controlled staffing concept, was lacking in 701, although by separate action there was an increase in the in-take of young officers, which -- if anything -- added to the congestion. The main emphasis was on a 'one-shot' separation of surplus people for reasons which had little to do with the rationalizing of the age-grade structure.* The effort to find the optimum curve, that is the ideal number of employees by age and by grade required to maintain flow in the system, was dropped.

25X1

* OP-10 Personnel Administration, An Overview, 1946-68, p.123

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

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1961, May

The CIA Management Staff was abolished leaving the position management function (numbers), which had never been very vigorously exercised, adrift.

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S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

1961, MAY Administrative obstacles, including the Comptroller, plus reluctance of the operators to put their plans on the line, caused the C/SWD to propose the elimination of the Career Service Ceilings, the Career Service Staffing authorization and other modifications to the Agency Manpower Control System introduced so hopefully in 1958. What was left was the flexible T/O and a Career Service Grade Authorization (CSGA) which set outer limits on number of promotions.

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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

1962, May

Formal Forecast of Personnel Requirements

25X1 In May 1962, on the heels of the 701 program, Placement Division, OP developed and presented to the DDS a recruiting requirement for [] people for the year to come, FY'63. Although the recruitment Branch had ordinarily prepared a guess-estimate in-house of future requirements, the 1962 Forecast was the first formal attempt at advance planning, one that would give the three support offices concerned with entering people on duty -- Personnel, Security, and Medical -- an early warning of impending workload. The forecast presented the various 'givens' such as attrition ratios and the ratios of candidates to actual eod's, in terms of four broad categories of personnel; Professional, Junior Officer Trainees, Communications, Clerical.* The forecast was a good technical job but one that was done entirely within the confines of the Office of Personnel with little 'grass roots' consultation; and little concern for other phases of manpower planning such as flow rate and selection out.

* OP-10 Personnel Administration, An Overview, 1946-68 p.159

S E C R E T

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1962, August

Kirkpatrick Task Force on Personnel Management

Among the 25 recommendations of the Kirkpatrick Task Force named to study personnel management in the CIA was one which dealt with manpower. The most important problem, said the Task Force, was that of moving out the required number of employees* each year in order to keep the flow of promotions and the personnel development program going. Their solution was to have the Director seek legislative authority to utilize the 'up or out' provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, and to open up supergrade authorizations; and for the Director of Personnel to be more aggressive in monitoring rotation and selection out. The DDS, Col. L.K.White, in a 31 August 1962 memo to the Acting DCI rejected the** recommendation, except for the supergrade expansion.

* No one ever succeeded in defining what this required number was.

** OP-10 Personnel Administration, An Overview, 1946-68 p.151

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

S E C R E T

1962Supergrade Expansion as Solution to Man-
Power Problems

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In 1962, with a supergrade ceiling of [] and with Agency strength holding at around the [] mark, there occurred what can best be described as a supergrade explosion. The Director of Personnel responding to strong demands from the DDP, the DDI and the DDS, particularly the latter, submitted for approval by the DCI some [] supergrade allocations. 25X1

The positions recommended for up-grading included the Chiefs of the major Branches in the DDP Area Divisions, the Chiefs of Support of the major Divisions and certain overseas stations. Key positions in the Office of Communications, senior positions in the Directorate of Research (DDR now DDS&T). There were three major forces at work behind this proposal. The 1962 Task Force on personnel management felt that the poor morale and dissatisfaction following the 701 program and the Bay of Pigs would be offset by opening up promotions at the top so as to break the blockage down the line. The Clandestine Services (plural then) which had been alighted in the original allocation of supergrade positions, were anxious to bring their grades up to the level of the Foreign Service, which had many FSO 1 and 2 officers -- equivalent to supergrades. Finally and probably most potent was the desire of the DDS to do something for the cadre of versatile and capable support officers that he had developed over the years.

The proposal, though approved by the DCI, caused consternation in the Bureau of the Budget which stated, 'This 90 percent increase in your existing totals of supergrades comes as a distinct shock particularly as it was unaccompanied by supporting data of any kind. Furthermore, said BOB, the timing was poor because the proposal came at a time when the President (JFK) was endeavoring to gain Congressional acceptance for the Pay Reform Act which would radically alter the pay scale up and

S E C R E T

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and down the line... The matter was eventually adjudicated by agreeing to pro-rate the supergrade allocation increase over a period of three years, amounting to a ceiling of not more than



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* OP-10 Personnel Administration, An Overview, 1946-68.p. 156

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

1964

Manpower and Position Management to the Fore

The persistence of the 'sky is the limit' philosophy, the lack of advance personnel planning at the Agency level, the policy of decentralized personnel management, all contributed to a feeble and fragmentary manpower planning effort. Then in 1964 the sky fell in. Stern ceilings were imposed by the highest levels in the government. Average grade controls and average salary controls became the order of the day. Strength was frozen as of 30 November 1963, reduced ceilings were announced for 1964 and a further reduction for FY '65 was imposed. The bewildering shift in emphasis from the mild internal ceilings of the past had these consequences:

Classification and Wage Division, OP shortly to be renamed Position Management and Compensation Division (PMCD) was hard hit to exercise its function. A 19 May 1964 directive of the Executive Director told the D/Personnel to take the necessary action to lower the average position grade to that of a year ago.

Recruitment Division had [] people in the pipeline and a doubled CT quota of []

25X1

Placement Division found a full role as guardian of the entrance gate. Daily reports of gains and losses were furnished to top management informally on a bulletin basis.

Since most attrition occurred at the clerical level, and hiring was frozen, the average grade went up automatically much to the chagrin of management. The sudden emphasis on control at a central point taxed the record, reporting and control aspects of the central Office of Personnel and set back the planning part of the planning and control function.*

S E C R E T

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1964, FY:

CSGA Preparation Passed to Statistical
Reporting Branch, (SRB), OP

During fiscal year 1964 (1 July 63 - 30 June 64) the responsibility for the preparation of the Career Service Grade Authorization (CSGA) was passed by the Salary and Wage Division of OP to the Statistical Reporting Branch. This monthly report informs each Career Service of the promotion headroom for each grade within the Service. Based in part on the Table of Organization and in part on service wide vacancies, CSGA, one of management's most important control tools, has been in continuous use since its introduction by SWD/OP in 1961.

S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

1965, FY:

MANS Codes and Reporting System Introduced

The emphasis was on the control side when the MANS Codes and System were introduced in FY'65. Started in 1963 by the Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting (OPPB) completed in mid-1964 by Office of Personnel* the system was established to identify by codes the functional activity, category and sub-category all the civilian positions in the Agency. The break-down follows:

Functional Activity Code -- Two numeric digits that identify the Functional Activity of the positions; for example, Overt Collection, Covert Collection, Technical Collection, etc.

Category Code -- Two numeric digits that identify the various categories under the Functional Activity.

Sub-Category Code -- Two alpha characters that identify type of category in which position title belongs and are as follows:

EA -- Professional Staff positions
EB -- Technical Staff Positions
EC -- Technical Communications Positions
ED -- Clerical Staff Positions
EF -- Professional Communications Positions
WE -- Wage Board Positions
FA, FB, FC, FD, FE -- Military Position*
GA, GB, GC, GD, GE -- Contract Position*

The MANS system was initiated by OPPB to assist the budget people in costing out the various Agency activities; but once the system was established it was not used for the original purpose and was set aside by the OPPB. After all the positions were given

* was the OP research analyst who carried on the MANS Codes Study.

S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

a MANS Code, OP began to use the sub-category code to identify and account for employees and positions by Professional, Technical, Clerical, Communicator, and Wage Board. Like the Career Designations that were introduced in 1953 and caused a tremendous increase in reports, these sub-category codes had a similar effect. The activity codes were never used however and, as of 1 October 1970, they were no longer recorded.

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

FY'65:

The Average Salary Report and the Career Service Budget Authorization Introduced.

In 1965 the Bureau of the Budget requested that the Agency control its average salary level. By joint effort of OPPB, Office of Computer Services and Office of Personnel (Statistical Reporting Branch and Salary and Wage Division) a system was implemented. The Average Salary Report and the Career Service Budget Authorization (CSBA) were based on overall totals within a Directorate* and not on the individual career services as was the CSGA. Distributed monthly from June 1965 until 31 July 1966 the programming effort that went into these reports was so major that the reports were discontinued in August 1966 and a separate allowance for personnel compensation adopted.

* Referred to in OP as the Grandfather Career Service level. Manpower control by career service never did work except for the control on numbers promoted(CSGA)

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S E C R E T

FY'66

Advance Staffing Plan Adopted

A new approach to the persistent problem of manpower planning was tried in 1966. There were two parts to the Advance Staffing Plan.

A preliminary forecast was prepared by the Plans and Review Staff (PRS) OP with the Planning, Programming and Budgeting (PPB) staff based on PPB's time cycle and manpower ceiling proposals. The preliminary estimate was derived from statistical formula and from the bulk unallocated ceiling. The estimate was spelled out in terms of gross categories of manpower required -- professional, career trainees, technical, communicator, and clerical covering the same years as the preliminary budget estimate. The preliminary estimate of manpower was sent to the support offices* -- Personnel, Security, Medical Services, Logistics -- where it served as a guide to impending workload and in preparation of their budgets.

The second part of the ASP was developed by PRS, OP as soon as the ceiling allocations were made by PPB to the components, it represented a more formidable undertaking. Personnel working with the components began the process of developing the requirements from the bottom up -- line by line and preferably by job title -- in order to compile the specific occupational requirements of the Agency six to eight months in advance of the fiscal year.

The average Advance Staffing Plan in the late 60's contained a requirement for approximately [] people for the upcoming fiscal year. Of these, about [] were for clerical personnel to replace losses and restock the 'pool'. There was a fixed quota for the Career Trainees, sometimes as high as [], the computer types might account for [] or so, communicator requirements amounted to another [] with the rest of the requirement spread across a variety of professions -- then [] varieties they were called -- ranging from medical doctors to business accountant, many of them one-of-a-kind 'rare-bird' types.

* During the regime of Robert Bannerman as the Deputy Director of (1966-70) Support, he would accept no other figure from the support offices.

FY'66 Retirement Age 60 Adopted as Policy

The passage of the CIA Retirement and Disability Act (CIARDS) in 1964 was a landmark in Agency manpower planning as well as in personnel administration. For the first time, there was a point of reference for the planner to estimate the departure rate of professional employees in the immediate future.

Then in 1966 the Civil Service Commission changed its retirement policies so that the federal employee could retire, without penalty, at age 55, with thirty years of service, or age 60 with twenty years of service. Since approximately two thirds (2/3) of the Agency were not eligible for CIARDS this action by the CSC made early retirement possible for most employees. Formal adoption of age 60 as the policy age for retirement across the board in the Agency gave the manpower planner another 'given' in his task of predicting outflow.*

* The voluntary-involuntary nature of retirement policies up to 1964 (CIARDS) and 1966 (CSC) made it very difficult for the manpower planner to use age as a predictor of outflow. Rather, experience patterns were used. It could be expected, for example, that almost one third (1/3) of the clerical force would leave voluntarily in any given year. In the professional fields, attrition was more difficult to predict. The economists would leave at the rate of about 20 a year; and for the engineers and the scientists, four years was a career, at least in the sixties.

FY'67 1967 a Peak Recruiting Year

25X1 The Advance Staffing Plan for 1967 called for
25X1 some [] requirements for new personnel of
 which more than [] entered on duty during the
 year.

FY'68 BALPA, Overseas Manpower Reductions

 An Acronym for balance of payments, BALPA was a
 government wide program aimed at cutting back the
 number of U.S. personnel overseas, excepting Viet-
 nam, in order to reduce the unfavorable trade
 balance of the United States. The cuts were based
 on percentages of total civilian strength includ-
 ing contract personnel. BALPA resulted in an ex-
 tremely unpleasant few months for the personnel
 control authorities as an exasperated top manage-
 ment tried to find the answers to what seemed to
 them to be relatively simple questions such as
 how many people CIA had overseas and their loca-
 tions. Suddenly it became extremely important
 to know, at Headquarters, not only the numbers
 of U.S. Staff personnel on whom there were good
 records but also contract, on whom there were no
 central records. Eventually, the process taking
 well into FY'68 and on the basis of an overseas
 Census taken by the Clandestine Service, contract
 personnel were cranked more closely into the per-
 sonnel accounting system.

 BALPA caused a sharp reduction in the Career Trainee
 quota (from 200 in FY'67 to less than 100 in FY'68)
 and added to the difficulties of manpower planning
 by stopping, temporarily, overseas rotation.

FY'69

Manpower Reduction Program Initiated by
Agency Management

In addition to government wide programs such as BALPA, Agency management* began in FY'69 a policy of modest decreases in Agency strength as established by a count at the end of the fiscal year (30 June). The cuts of 5% per annum or less were accomplished without much manpower planning effort, usually by close control of the input of new employees in the final quarter of the fiscal year, such control being exercised by the Placement Div. Results, which do not include Part time or Temporary Assignment Section adjustments, brought the Agency from a staff employee strength of [] in 1969 to [] in 1972.

25X1

* Personnel Administration in a Time of Change, An Overview 1969-1975, p. 2

PART III

Page

The 1970's. Advance Staffing Plan to Placement, Staff Personnel Division, FY'70; OPRED Succeeds BALPA, FY'70; Manpower Reductions of 5% Per Annum Achieved by Retirement, FY'71; Government Wide Cuts in Strength and Average Grade Imposed, FY'72; the Schlesinger Slash, FY'73; Common Manpower Planning and Personnel Management Approach Adopted by new DCI, PDP, PASG, APP, FY'74; Increase in Average Grade, FY'70 to '75.

29-35

FY'70 Advance Staffing Plan to Placement
(Staff Personnel Division)

On 25 September 1969, the Placement Division, OP was renamed the Staff Personnel Division. SPD took over the preparation of the Advance Staffing Plan from the Plans and Review Staff (PRS) shortly thereafter. After four years of operation, the DD/Pers/PC* thought that the ASP should be administered by an operating division in OP. The manpower reduction and the BALPA and OPRED programs had resulted in a marked reduction of requirements for new personnel. The SPD also became heavily involved in monitoring personnel input against losses in relation to reduced ceiling goals.**

FY'70 OPRED Succeeds BALPA

During Jan 1970, the President's program to reduce US government employment overseas, which placed severe monitoring and reporting requirements (control) on the Statistical reporting Branch (SRB) OP, became OPRED (Overseas Personnel Reduction)

*

** OP-14 Personnel Placement in CIA, 1946-71 by
 Nov 1972 p. 42

FY'71 Manpower Reductions Achieved by Retirements

In FY'71 employees took things into their own hands as a result of the liberalization of Civil Service Commission (CSC) policies on retirement. The change to the high-3 formula for computing annuities, the drop in the age limits at which an individual could retire without penalty, the crediting of sick leave toward retirement, and the payment of cost of living increases to annuitants resulted in [] people retiring, almost double any previous year. Agency strength dropped by [] to [] (FY'71) an outcome that was not unwelcome to management but one which had not been anticipated in advance planning.*

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25X1

In September 1970 (FY'71) the Plans Staff and the Review Staff were set up separately, the former to develop plans and the latter to handle the regulations and conduct an after the fact examination of Personnel plans and policies. At this point the Advance Staffing Plan was the responsibility of Placement (Staff Personnel Division) and the Plans Staff, newly freed from the review function, began development of the Personnel Management and Movement Plan. (PMMP) designed to facilitate both career development and movement including out-flow of professional personnel. PMMP was later to be overtaken and superseded by a number of personnel plans, the Personnel Approach Study Group and other personnel plans initiated and pushed by William E. Colby both as Executive Director Comptroller, (Jan 1972 - August 1973) and Director of Central Intelligence, (Aug 1973 - March 1976).

* Personnel Administration in a Time of Change, An Overview, 1969-75 p. 6

** [] was named Chief of the Plans Staff in August 1970

FY'72 Government Wide Cuts in Strength and Average
Grade Imposed

Beginning in 1972 manpower reduction in the Agency was enmeshed in government-wide programs. In that year the President ordered a five percent reduction throughout the government, with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) then ordering a roll back in the average grade of one tenth of one percent in FY'72 and again in FY'73. Within the Agency, a repetition of the 1964 fiasco threatened. At that time the imposition of a personnel freeze had the effect of raising the average grade, since it was mostly clerical personnel who left voluntarily; and a deep cut in average grade to make headroom caused great disruption in the Agency.*

Studies by OP Plans Staff, Review Staff and the Statistical Reporting Branch demonstrated that if the five percent reduction and the one tenth of a grade roll back were accomplished in FY'72 it would mean a permanent suspension of all promotions for that year and the separation of hundreds of employees. Based on these studies and subsequent presentations to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) the Agency was permitted to accomplish its five percent reduction over the two year span, FY'72-'73 and excused from the average grade roll back. The actual reduction for FY'72 was 687 and Agency strength dropped to **. 25X1

* Refer p. 171 of Personnel Administration, An Overview, 1946-68.

** Harry B. Fisher, who had succeeded Robert Wattles as Director of Personnel in January 1971, described how he went about this task for the Oral History excerpted in Part IV

FY'73 The Schlesinger Slash

The manpower policy of gradualism, as accomplished by voluntary separation, ended with a jolt upon the appointment of a new Director, James R. Schlesinger, in February 1973. A very grave crisis in Agency personnel administration resulted from this appointment.* At first the new Director's instructions to the Director of Personnel were to get rid of 1,000 people in thirty days. The dictum was later modified to 700 people over and above normal attrition during the three remaining months of the fiscal year. Advance Personnel planning failed to anticipate the extreme cutback which was announced to the employees on 26 March 1973. The reduction process was greatly eased by the cooperative action of the employees themselves, many of whom volunteered to leave under the broadened retirement options. Personnel strength as of 30 June 1973 was [] a reduction of [] from the previous June.

25X1

* The crisis and the actions taken were described by Fisher for the Oral History and excerpts are contained in Part IV

FY'74 A Common Manpower Planning and Personnel
Management Approach Adopted by new DCI,
PDP, APP, PASG.

While still Executive Director-Comptroller (Jan 72-Aug 73) William E. Colby expressed what he thought was the solution to Agency personnel problems in these terms:

As to alternatives between centralized personnel management and the decentralized system we have today, I think neither is the right answer. The decentralized system provides personalized treatment of the enormous variety of individual skills and capabilities our people have. At the same time the centralized system allows inequities and inconsistencies in the personnel management because of bureaucratic divisions. The latter problem can be solved by centralized reporting of personnel activities and by imposing a common planning process and guidelines for decision making.

Even before Colby became DCI in August of 1973; OP Plans Staff had expanded the Personnel Management and Movement Plan (PMMP) to meet the requirements of the Ex-Dir and the Civil Service Commission Directive of Executive Development. It eventually became the Personnel Development Plan (PDP) launched on 1 July 1973 (FY'74).

Simultaneously, work was progressing on a personnel budgeting system tied in with the Management By Objective Program and this became, also on 1 July 1973, the Annual Personnel Plan. (APP) Coverages of APP included on duty strength statistics, Manpower Analysis, including desired gains and anticipated losses both voluntary and involuntary, Training, and a new factor, that of Equal Employment Opportunity staffing. The span of the APP was one fiscal year. The plan was designed to give the Director and the Deputies a means of review and of monitoring progress in manpower planning.*

Another study, adopted in April 1974, as a result of the work of the Personnel Approaches Study Group (PASG) examined and revised the system for personnel management in the Agency including reduction of the career services to five.

* Complete coverages of the APP contained in Appendix E, p 86

FY'75 Increase in Average Grade FY'70-75

An important aspect of manpower planning, at least in the opinion of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) had to do with holding the line on increases in so called Upper Level (GS-14 and up) and Supergrade incumbents*, and with average grade across the board. Position Management and Compensation Division (PMCD) OP struggled with this problem not too successfully. Average Grade of incumbents went from [] at the end of FY'70 to [] in FY'75 despite the exodus of [] percent of those holding GS-14 positions and up in FY'70, and an influx of young clerical people. Supergrade incumbents as a percentage of total GS Personnel went from [] The following showed the comings and the goings:

Strength, Reduction, Separations, E.O.D.s, FY'70-
FY'75**

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25X1

25X1

- * A mitigating circumstance involved the Directorate of Science and Technology (DDS&T) which went from [] people in FY'70 to [] in FY'74. The Agency was both releasing and hiring people, and most of the new professional 'hires' were Higher Grade scientists and engineers.
- ** Separations includes retirements. Separations and E.O.D.s exclude detailed military personnel. Retirement statistics are from the ROB/RAD/OP. All others are from Statistical Reporting Branch (SRB) OP.

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PART IV. A.

Control Always Was a Problem. William J. Kelly the first Personnel Director, described the early (1947-48) problems with personnel statistics. Kelly was responding to a question on the personnel reporting (control) function. The excerpts are from Tape Number 1 made on 10 Nov 1970.

Yes, there was, very definitely, a statistical reporting function going to the Executive for Administration and Management namely [] all through this period. It was a continuing problem because the reporting form was designed by [] who was serving as the Director of the Management Staff, or Chief of the Management Staff. He and a girl named [] developed this form for reporting. [] and the Processing people would work 'til all hours on making the report come out right. It was a weekly statistical summary of how many procurement actions we had, how many cases were put in the process, how many were in security, how long they had been in security, how many people actually entered on duty, and that sort of thing. The only thing is, that the report would come out of the Personnel Office, namely [] shop in correct fashion, but you had to supply the Executives for Administration and Management a rough draft copy of it, and then he would proceed to tear it to pieces and fill in the figures the way he wanted them to come out for presentation to the Deputy Director [Capt.] Pinky Wright.

Of course, that was fine, until it came up to a point where you had to check the figures in [] [] statistical reporting with the monthly figures that came out, for example, of Shef Edwards shop on security clearances. Nothing jibed.

S E C R E T

PART IV B.

The Requirements Boom of the Early Fifties, according to George Meloon and []

25X1

George E. Meloon described the initial planning for OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) (Covert Action) for the Oral History on Tape No. 6 made on 21 Jan 1971.

Initial (August 1948) OPC T/O of [] positions was expanded to [] positions equaling in size the rest of the Agency. OPC succeeded the Special Projects Group, OSO headed by [] [] Credit goes to [] who was the only classifier to have access to OPC T/Os and drew up functional charts and job sheets for the expanded organization based on plans furnished by [] who was Executive Officer to Frank Wisner at that time.

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25X1

25X1

25X1

Incident: As covert Personnel Officer, Meloon sat in on [] (Executive for Administration and Management) staff meetings and at one of them suggested to [] as Chief of Services that he had better start looking for space for OPC expansion of [] [] asked source of information and when advised, told the group not to concern themselves with the request as OPC was not going to get any such figure. [] then briefed [] who repeated [] remark. Two weeks later a [] ceiling was approved for OPC.

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S E C R E T

25X1 Part IV B. (Cont'd) []

Veteran Personnel Officer [] described the additional requirements in the '49-'51 period for the Oral History in Tape 14 made on 13 May 1971. 25X1

25X1 With many changes in 49, 50, and 51, the establishment of additional missions and the firm establishment of OPC, we found ourselves with requirements at [] people. Still attempting to do the job with twelve or fifteen people. It became evident that recruiters should specialize so that we broke the procurement staff into two basic types of recruiting, clerical and professional and swelled the ranks accordingly. When I left recruiting in the summer of 1951, we were attempting to cover the country with [] recruiters. 25X1 The task had grown tremendously, particularly with the advent of requirements for para-military operations. We found ourselves looking down the barrel of a recruitment requirement which was coming up to [] in 25X1 terms of both clerical type recruitment for replacement of losses as well as recruitment for new jobs and new shows that were just getting started. It became clear that the recruitment office had to be expanded to get the job done within the time allotted. Shortly after my departure the recruiting staff went up to something like [] 25X1 []

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

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PART IV B. (Cont'd) Meloon

George E. Meloon quoted from Tape No. 7 made on 22 January 1971.

Size of recruitment job indicated by the fact that in June 1950 strength was in the neighborhood of [] and reached [] in June 1951 although part of this increase resulted from surfacing of contract employees not previously counted in strength; by December 1951 strength had increased by another [] [] or so and then between December 1951 and December 1952 the increase was of the order of [] [] In addition to the increase, an attrition of about [] a month had to be replaced which adds another [] so that we were bringing at least [] on board a year for three years and between December 1951 and December 1952 closer [] (Strength figures June 51, []; December 1951, [] December 1952, [] December 1953, [] JJW). Considering about twenty initial contacts to put ten in process and from this ten probably one entering on duty, the pressure on the recruiters was tremendous to keep the flow going.

S E C R E T

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PART IV C.

The first ceiling was imposed by the DCI, General Walter Bedell Smith in circumstances described by Col. L. K. White for the OP Oral History, Tape 9, made on 5 March 1971.

Personnel Administration Program first came to my (Colonel White's) attention shortly after appointment as Assistant Deputy Director, Administration, A/DDA effective 1 January 1952. The expected overlap with predecessor [] was not possible and boss (Walter R. Wolf) ill with pneumonia so that I became deeply enmeshed in responsibility without training. Fortunately I was able to answer General Bedell Smith's questions at an early staff meeting, "How many people do we have in next year's budget?" The [] answer caused consternation and led to the DCI's instruction, "When you have half that number on board, stop recruiting." Upon finding that the actual strength at the time was approximately [] with [] in the pipeline, I wrote a military type staff study, one of the first in the Agency, recommending that we take the [] and freeze the Agency at the [] figure. No immediate response from the DCI. so first confrontation with General Bedell Smith ensued, a crisp exchange with the General consenting to read the paper because it was only two pages in length. "Nobody in this Agency ever wrote a paper that was only two pages long." Upon being reassured about the two pages, General Smith read it and approved the [] personnel ceiling on the spot. Rapport with the DCI was good from then on. Sequel to the decision to stop recruiting was the resignation of F. Trubee Davison, the Assistant Director, Personnel, AD/Pers. When informed of the decision to stop with what was in the pipeline, General Davison said, "Thank you very much, I quit," a statement which, despite Davison's wealth and prestige-- he had been an Assistant Secretary of Defense -- did not seem to excite the DCI unduly.

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S E C R E T

PART IV D.

First Attempt at Advance Manpower Planning: the Controlled Staffing Concept, 1959 -- as described by [redacted], from Tape Number 16 made on 21 May 1971.

As Chief of the Personnel Assignment Division (PAD) from June 1957 - May 1959, I made initial studies and comparisons of age and grade structure of the various career services to see which seemed to be out of alignment in terms of distribution of age groups. Analyses of the age distribution were provided to the heads of the career services to alert them to future problems which might emerge if they did not change their practices as to the recruitment of personnel by the various age groups. During the latter part of the tour in PAD, which had been renamed Personnel Operations Division (POD), I initiated work which was subsequently incorporated in the Agency Manpower Control Program. This included procedure for the separation of personnel who were surplus to the needs of each career service. The program was carefully checked with representatives of the Civil Service Commission and with the President's Advisor for Personnel Management and the concurrence of both was obtained.**

The Manpower Control Program and the studies that preceded it pointed out the need to remove some individuals from the hump and to fill in with

* [redacted] held a number of important positions in the Office of Personnel during his career in the Agency including Chief, Personnel Evaluation Division (PED), Chief, Personnel Operations Div. (POD), Chief, Clandestine Services Personnel Office (CSPO). He, with [redacted] were the main architects of Agency Manpower Planning in the late 1950's. [redacted] work has been described in MONO 40, Number 3 on Classification.

** This study led to the famous Hump Chart which was a comparison of Optimum and Projected CSCS Age and Grade Distribution, CS Males, GS-9 and above. A copy is contained in Appendix B, p. 74.

S E C R E T

25X1 PART IV D. (Cont'd) []

a larger number of young officers in order to obtain a better balanced structure. The paring away of the hump was done only slightly. However, partly as a result of the studies the input of younger officers was increased substantially. The age and grade structure today is improved considerably over that which was forecast ten years ago. Part of the improvement resulted from the passage of the CIA Retirement System which did cause a number of officers in their fifties and below to opt for retirement who would not otherwise have left. The Manpower Control studies, those of the age and grade structure and the personnel hump, were largely the basis for and the justification of the CIA Retirement Act.

25X1 Excerpts from [] Tape repeated from MONO 3, because their importance as landmarks in Agency Manpower Planning. They are from Tape 16.

Re: Manpower Control System

The development of the Manpower Control system now covered in [] actually started in 1955 and was developed during the subsequent five years. The system provided for the identification of all T/O positions according to the career service responsible for staffing the position. It provided for a staffing complement for each organization unit which included all the work load positions. These are productive positions filled by people on the desk or on duty. It also provided for a development complement which was the non-work load complement. In it were placed individuals who were not contributing to the actual work load of the component on a day to day basis. These individuals might be in training for a new assignment or be between assignments or on extended annual, sick or maternity leave, or they might be detailed outside the Agency. The purpose of the development complement was to provide a better cost accounting system, to give a better picture of the actual number of people required to do the day to day work of the organization as compared with the overhead, the non-productive people who were carried on the payroll but were not actually at work. The staffing

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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

25X1 PART IV. D. (Cont'd)

complement included two categories of positions. The fixed position could be occupied by only a single occupant or a fixed number, for example, only one chief was approved for a unit. The unit might have three branch chief positions and these were limited to three incumbencies. The flexible positions were those in which the number of incumbents might vary on a day to day basis according to the work load requirements. By having a position designated as flexible, if the work load increased in a unit, a new person could be assigned to the flexible position without changing the staffing complement. This system of fixed and flexible positions has continued to the current time and has proved to be a practical means of managing a table or organization.

Re: Career Service Ceilings

About 1958 it was proposed that the personnel ceiling would be allocated not to organizations but to career services and would be managed by the Career Service. Thus a T/O for an area division in the CS might include a ceiling for CS positions which would be administered by the DDP. It would also include a ceiling for support positions, logistics, finance, which would be controlled by the Head of the Career Service of the parent office involved. This system was not actually adopted due to a number of complications that arose in attempting to work out procedures that would apply.

Re: Career Service Grade Authorization, CSGA

Since promotion and recruitment are controlled by the Career Service a means of control called the Career Service Grade Authorization was established. The CSGA consisted of a tabulation by grade of all positions designated to a career service regardless of the T/O on which they are located. This means that the Personnel CSGA, for example, included all the positions by grade located in the central office and located in other components of the

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

PART IV. D. (Cont'd) Sheay

of the Agency. By making this tabulation the Personnel Career Service could compare the number of positions by grade with the authorization at each grade level and know the promotion headroom. Likewise the CSGA would show those grades in which there were shortages and provide a guideline to be used for recruitment actions. The CSGA continues in existence to the current time and has provided a reliable method of controlling promotions. It is consistent with the Personal Rank Assignment procedures in that when headroom exists in the CSGA an individual may be promoted to the grade in which the headroom exists even though his own position may be of lower grade. This has been an essential part of our competitive promotion system.

S E C R E T

PART IV. E.

On the basis of the Manpower Studies, Gordon M. Stewart turned the rationale for the retirement program around and launched the controversial 701 program of Selection Out. The excerpts are from Tape 12 made on 7 May 1971.

In developing this material, Manpower Control, the factual foundation was developed that the Agency had to have to make its case for early retirement legislation and that the Office of Personnel had to have too in order to get the 701 procedures accepted and implemented. Larry Houston had said that the Agency's retirement legislation proposals had been based entirely too much on the claim that overseas service wore a man out. This claim would not stand up with the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee. By drawing a profile and showing that the average age would go higher and higher as the years passed by, it was possible to make a case based on the needs of the service rather than one based on a reward to the individual for his service overseas.

The various Manpower Studies reinforced top management's feeling that the Agency had too many people. Because of the clarity of the thought, the following excerpt from a Memorandum to the DDCI dated 6 Nov 1959 is included. (Unfortunately the execution of 701 was not up to the standard of the planning as will be seen in subsequent excerpts from the Oral History*. J.J.W. note)

"The traditional approach to a large scale reduction or staffing change is to do it as quickly as possible, and then start afresh. Take your public beating, and expect that the incident will soon be forgotten. This approach has merit and should be followed in solving part of the problem of the Clandestine Services. There should, in other words, be one reduction of surplus personnel and

S E C R E T

PART IV. E. (Cont'd) Stewart

every effort should be made to include in it all persons who can be spared at that time. This would then be followed by a lively selection-out and early retirement program which would meet the further requirements of the service.

"a. It is our opinion that the initial sizeable separation action will have a profound effect on morale. The Clandestine Services Career Service is a tightly knit group. Popular officers will of necessity be included among those to be separated. At the same time there is a strong feeling of frustration widespread among the best Clandestine Services officers which has its origin in the Agency's apparent inability to solve the manpower problem. In balance, it is our estimate that no permanent harm will be done to the Clandestine Services by undertaking a broad separation action.

"b. Annual selection-out will never be popular. It is not popular among those services that practice it. It will be an obstacle to recruitment, but one that can be met. Over a period of time, we will be able to develop and expand information programs and services that will help employees adjust their thinking to selection-out."

PART IV. F.

Emmett Echols on the 701 Program. The 701 Program peaked in 1961 under Emmett Echols as Director of Personnel. Despite Stewart's caution that it should be quick and merciful, it was slow and torturous. Echols described his actions on Tape 23 made on 26 Aug. 1971.*

In the late fifties the Agency was under great pressure to reduce the numbers of its personnel. There were many employees who had formerly been of great usefulness to the Agency, who, following the Korean War were surplus. Up to this time the Agency believed, the Office of Personnel and the various Directors of Personnel believed, that the Agency in the event of reduction in force had absolutely no choice but to comply with standard government 'RIF' procedures. This would mean giving veteran's preference and plain seniority preference to the detriment of our highly selective recruitment program and of the specialized skills that many people had, that simply could not be found in persons of comparable seniority. So it was recognized that in a reduction in force carried on by standard government procedures, the Agency would lose much of its best talent, talent which it would be very difficult if not impossible to replace. I (Echols) was convinced that under the very special legislative authorities of the Agency that if the Agency asserted the need for deviation from normal government RIF procedures based on the exigencies of our peculiar service that we might be able to get away with it and so proposed. Other senior officials agreed that this was highly desirable but saw no way of

* Echols succeeded Stewart as Director of Personnel on 6 June 1960. The views of others, (L.K.White, [redacted], [redacted] and Matthew Baird) on the 701 Program are contained at Sources 115 & 116, Personnel Administration, An Overview, 1946-68.

25X1

S E C R E T

PART IV. F. (Cont'd) Echols

releasing people on a basis that contradicted prescribed government procedures and in any event saw any reduction as bringing great hardships on individuals concerned. Unlike other government employees, ours did not have access to civil service reassignment and reemployment procedures which permitted people to move from one government agency to another. It was also recognized that as government employees, CIA people were looked upon as being different and the fear was that they would not get a fair shake in seeking employment with other Agencies. To overcome the objection that such a program would create hardship and that it might take our people many months to find other employment during which they would have to live some way, Echols devised the concept of separation compensation based on a formula related to salary grade with a maximum amount of money an individual could draw from the government even though he was performing no services. The government to Echols' knowledge never had any such plan and his first effort was to go to the Bureau of the Budget, point out the nature of the problem, tell them what we proposed to do and ascertain if there were any objections. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget was very sympathetic and advised that his office would not object. The Executive Director of the Civil Service Commission likewise said they would impose no objections. With this backing Echols went to the DCI with a specific proposal which he approved. With this in hand, operating officials who had objected to an RIF program out of loyalty to their employees who might be surplus withdrew their objections and wholeheartedly backed the program because under it they would be able to keep their best personnel and release only those who were either surplus to their requirements or who were of less value than others.

A major objective of the 701 Program was to accomplish the release of surplus personnel without any stigma accruing to the individual. It was hoped to be an objective analysis of the non staff employees in any Agency element, the determination of

S E C R E T

PART IV. F. (Cont'd) Echols

the number of surplus personnel and then the selection of those least valuable or least essential to the continuation of programs at the then level of activity. Those who were found surplus to any one element would then be considered as being available for other elements to whom their skills might be more valuable than personnel in those elements possibly. The net of this process would be the ultimate identification of that body of employees who were least useful to the Agency through no fault of their own. In practice lots of things happened. As was only natural every operating official who was biased or prejudiced against an individual for whatever reason sought to get rid of people whom he did not care for. The reason might be personal, it might be a matter of reputation only, and as subsequently turned out, a great deal of bias and prejudice existed in the selections and identifications. The fact that numerous notoriously inefficient problem employees were in this category (of surplus) unavoidably gave a stigma to the entire process as well. The selection process by intent was based heavily on a review of the fitness reports and performance records of individuals over the years. It subsequently became apparent that many supervisors over the years had given glowing fitness reports to people who were in fact marginal performers. Many of the reasons given were that in the overseas environment, particularly small stations, where it was necessary to work closely with a person, supervisors simply did not dare honestly or truthfully to evaluate performance because of the impact it would have on relationships with the individual and ability to continue working with him.

Again, some fitness reports proved very poor for the opposite reason as a result often of personal misunderstandings and disagreements between supervisors and their subordinates. These fitness reports were reviewed then by operating officials who perhaps had no personal contact whatsoever with the individual, knew nothing about his true competence. Quite a few bad judgments were made as to

S E C R E T

PART IV. F. (Cont'd) Echols

who were the most marginal employees and when the final announcements were made, employees selected who thought that injustices had been performed to them, appealed to other friends in the Agency who knew that they were not as bad as the record would appear. All in all, Echols' judgment is that perhaps five percent of the selections were possibly erroneous and another five percent of individuals were not nominated for 701 separation because of intense feelings of loyalty and friendship had prevailed. One of the major values of this program, however, however, it finally worked out, was that it did establish once and for all the legal right of the Agency to conduct a reduction in force without regard to the specific preference regulations of the Civil Service. Without any question in Echols' mind, the ideal reduction program in any organization is to remove the least valuable, the least efficient employees. In the intelligence business, in particular, there is less latitude for loss of extraordinary talents and skills by such arbitrary standards as veteran preference and seniority. In addition to reviewing employees in terms of such things as past performance, fitness reports and general reputation, a further criterion was provided for breaking ties and that was the individual's potential for further growth. In a given organization component, for example, there might be a half a dozen employees performing relatively the same job having the same relative skills and perhaps highly comparable performance records but a number of these might be surplus to the then current and projected work load. The problem then would be to select from among comparable employees those who were surplus. Here is where the potential for further growth came in handy. The emphasis in the Agency at that time in its long range personnel planning was personnel development through training, job rotation, and a constant upgrading of the caliber of Agency personnel. By giving weight to the criterion of potential for further growth it would strengthen the concept of building for the future. The adoption of this criterion was in effect a tiebreaker designed to foster the long term improvement of Agency staffing.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

PART IV. G.

Robert S. Wattles (D/Pers from Feb 1968 - January 1971) on Advance Planning and Manpower Controls. The excerpts are from Tape 21 made on 3 August 1971.

The first thing that can be said about Advance Planning is that there has not been any until the last few years. The whole philosophy in the early days of the Agency was one of growth, a big impetus from the Korean War, sky was the limit, money was free. If we needed more buildings, we got them; if we needed more people, we got them and whenever anybody had a new idea and it was not a matter of taking somebody on board to do it, we simply went out and hired some more people to do it. There was no competition within the Agency. The competition was all with the outside community. With this whole philosophy running through the entire Agency, when the day came that somebody really put the brakes on, the Bureau of the Budget set ceiling figures, average employment figures, average grade controls, the line managers did not know what to do. Hence, POD had to put on a day to day count. But on the matter of planning there was no long range analysis and in retrospect Wattles thinks now that this was something that George Meloon said a long time ago, that we were going to reap the whirlwind one of these days. There was no attempt, up to 1962 at least, there was no attempt to plot what was happening with input. About this time it is true that [] in the Plans Staff had plotted the hump. (JJW Note: It was in 1959 in his paper on Controlled Staffing.) but [] must have been a prophet without honor in his own country because he was not getting much attention. "Certainly if we were as smart in the Sixties as we think we are in the Seventies, we could have done a much better job of long range forecasting, rate of turnover, natural attrition, forced attrition, and rate of advancement in the service, and therefore the rate at which you put them in at the bottom; given the fact that we have a philosophy of a competitive service in which most of the professionals come in at the bottom and develop up through the

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S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

PART IV. G. (Cont'd) Wattles

system. But the line managers were not on board with this and nobody else was forcing it."

The ADP effort was something that started when I (Wattles) was in POD and grew out of the records and control function of POD. It was not unrelated to the business of the day to day count. If we had a good machine data system back in 1962 and 1963 when the squeeze came on, we would have been in a much better position as against people sitting down each day hand counting personnel actions, EOD's and separations, in order to get a day by day, component by component, gains and losses figure. The management of personnel numbers is miserably complicated by the fact that programs and budgets and therefore personnel ceilings, authorized strength are by components of Agency organization as against management of people by career service. This can be noted particularly in the Support Directorate at year end when there are overlaps with the Clandestine Services. Two finance officers charged to the Saigon Station when only one is authorized, two charged because one is there and the other is going. Strength is laid on and money is allocated and authorizations are made by component and yet the Director of Finance, the head of the career service, has to manage people only half of whom are in the Office of Finance and the rest are someplace else. Final machine accounting may never be possible as long as there is this duality of management as far as people are concerned.

S E C R E T

PART IV. H.

Harry B. Fisher (D/Pers from Jan 1971 to June 1973) on Manpower Reductions and the Handling of the Schlesinger Slash of 1973. The excerpts are from Tape 41 made on 15 Aug 1945.

Re: The DCI ordered Manpower Reductions of '71-'73 of 5% or less.

To do this we started by projecting normal attrition at all levels both clerical and professional. History was fairly accurate in terms of how many people we would lose. We cranked into this the normal attrition from all sources including retirement. Given that figure subtracted from our present strength we then knew we could hire as many people as we would then need to reach the newly established lower goal. That figure was given for planning purposes to the interested parties in the Office of Personnel who controlled EOD's and was also parceled out in terms of additional EOD's to the various Deputies. I had developed a spread sheet format that proved fairly effective in my negotiations with OMB on personnel strengths. It illustrated rather graphically what I have just finished describing. It would start off with the current strength. It would project as a percentage the losses that were to be expected, it would leave us then with the situation prevailing if we hired no one. I would then inject what I considered the maximum cut that we could take to establish a new ceiling goal, and followed that with the conclusion as to the number and levels of people we could hire. I did seem to be able to persuade OMB that a cut to a lower figure could be absorbed only by one of two undesirable options, that is, either stopping the flow of young blood and of new types of people that had to be brought on board to meet the new technical requirements, or firing people. I think that we were fortunate that, at that point of time, the Administration was not too anxious to have forced resignations and the logic of keeping a flow of a minimum number of professionals was certainly accepted by them. By this

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

PART IV. H. (Cont'd) Fisher

means OMB personnel, certainly our representative, seemed to accept from me as the years went on, the predictions which had proven accurate in previous years, that we would lose a fixed number of people, and history proved that was how many we did lose. And also that the minimum number of people that we needed to do the job was acceptable to them. These came up to a cut of about five percent a year which could be taken without seriously affecting the operation of the Agency. This was what Dick Helms wanted and I am sure that he looked forward to eventually getting down to a much lower figure but doing it gradually over a period of years running about [] a year. Generally the problem was that OMB would start out by saying why can't you take a ten percent cut. My job, (would be to counter) in keeping with the orders from the Director plus what I believed to be a wise policy of a gradual reduction. Never, never was there any argument in my mind, or in Col. White's mind or in the Director's mind that the Agency had grown too large. We all recognized, particularly after the cuts overseas, and the return of personnel that many of these people were truly squirreled away to protect them and that the Agency had grown much too large at the Headquarters level. Our desire was to do it in a gradual fashion so that we could adjust to this lower personnel figure.

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Re: The Schlesinger Slash of 1973

The picture in terms of cutting the Agency in gradual increments of about five percent a year changed radically when Mr. Schlesinger came on board. My first meeting with him was marked by his statement to me, that he wanted me to get rid of a [] people in 90 days. I reeled but said, 'well, although I thought we could manage significant cuts, that seemed like a little too much a little too fast'. I could see from the expression on his face that he did not want to debate it at that point, and so I withdrew. But I did subsequently write a paper ordering the cut, for Mr. Schlesinger to sign, which, I forwarded through Mr. Colby who did buy it, which I feel was the key

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S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

PART IV. H. (Cont'd) Fisher

to keeping the Agency from a disastrous 30 day period. This letter, which I am sure is on file as sort of the kick-off letter for this big cut, did not mention numbers, did not mention time period. I was a bit surprised when Mr. Schlesinger signed it. It did say that there were many people who were redundant and there were people who should move on and that we were going to get on with a reduction in the minimum time possible or words to that effect. So this (DCI Memo) did take away from the cut the mandated [redacted] people in 30 days. Now I still feel that Mr. Schlesinger knew exactly what he was signing. Nevertheless, in his own mind and in subsequent discussions with me he would always speak of the [redacted] people and the 30 days. But that was not the mandate that was given to each of the components. I do feel that each of the Deputies tried very hard to meet the spirit of what the Director wanted. As a matter of fact it is my opinion that they almost became competitive. I had Deputies calling me and asking how many cuts the other Directorates had made. Maybe they made a hundred and this Directorate had twice as many people so maybe they better get rid of two hundred or they would not look too good with the new Director. So a little bit of this kind of thing did get into it. Nevertheless, at the conclusion of this entire exercise as the cuts approached about [redacted] instead of [redacted] and the people were automatically given until 30 June to get out. Since this letter was written in February, they had about four or four and a half months to get out. This was never officially condoned by the Director but I am sure he knew what was happening and he did not object to it.

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How the Schlesinger Cuts Were Made

Following the signing of the major cut letter by Mr. Schlesinger, I prepared, working with the Deputies, a format for a letter which they in turn would send to their subordinates explaining how these cuts would be taken. In addition I prepared a step by step outline which went to all the Deputies explaining exactly what would happen from the day the

S E C R E T

PART IV. H. (Cont'd) Fisher

man was called in and told that he would probably be terminated, all the way through the final appeals that would be available to him. I think there must have been twenty odd steps and I am sure you will find this in the file because I did have Helen keep all this stuff together. Most of the people availed themselves of their appeal to their Deputies, and when that was turned down, they would appeal through the Director of Personnel, which normally would start with [] shop. If they were not satisfied there, they then would appeal to me. I saw many of these people personally in an effort to solve their problems. We also, in addition to cranking up the Outplacement Service, had [] in Placement honestly shopping these people around to find other jobs where they could be used at their present or even at a reduced grade. We had more than just a limited success in placing some of these people.

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I have to admit that when it was all over we got rid of a lot of people we should have gotten rid of. It was probably the first time that young GS-11's and 12's in the DDI who were not productive, were forced out. It never hurt me as much when a thirty-two year old or a thirty-four year old had to leave because it was probably just as well that the man left while he still had the opportunity to serve somewhere else. Nor did it bother me when the non-productive employee who had peaked out but was fully entitled to retirement had to leave. The very difficult cases were the forty-five or the forty-seven or forty-eight year old man who found himself a little late in life to start a new career, normally with a large family with financial burdens at a peak, and not yet qualified for any type of an annuity. These were the ones whom we spent the greatest amount of time in an effort to find other work for them.

S E C R E T

PART IV. I.

25X1 [] (Chief, Position Management and Compensation Division, PMCD, OP) on the All Chiefs and No Indians Syndrome. The excerpt is from Tape 47 made on 9 May 1975.

The primary problem we have had in connection with ceiling reductions in the Agency is the tendency of all components to maintain as many as possible of their higher level, upper level and supergrade positions. In a period of declining Agency strength Mr. Colby has indicated a number of times that the Agency should require fewer supergrades. But in every review we have made, every component has always been looking for more supergrades. With the rigid ceiling controls no components have succeeded in getting more except at the expense of other components or unused ceiling -- but -- there is apparently this strong interest in getting more. In the same way with upper level positions, GS-14 and above -- there is continuing pressure for increase. The function of PMCD is primarily a matter of finding out what positions are worth. It is always possible to increase the average grade legitimately. The only way that the escalation can be controlled is by an interest on the part of top management, and on the part of management of the various organizations in the Agency, in holding the grades down; in attempting to maintain reasonable levels; in having a logical approach to what jobs are worth. But this has never been apparent. In all the years that we (PMCD) have operated in this Agency there has never been any indication that senior officials have any interest in holding grades at a reasonable level. This (state of mind) appears in practically all the top components. When Mr. Brownman became (DD(M&S) Deputy Director Management and Support, the first thing he said was that he thought it would be a lot better for components to establish their own grades. They would show more judgment in establishing grades on their own but after he had been

S E C R E T

PART IV. I. (Cont'd)

25X1

in the job for a while his view was different. Turning the components loose would be like putting the fox in the hen house; they (the components) would use absolutely no discretion in upgrading positions. There is continuing pressure from all components for higher grades and more upper levels. We (PMCD) have seen no indication that this is ever going to change.


What's Left in 1974 of the Manpower Control System Begun so Hopefully in 1958.

The Position Management and Manpower Control System which includes the so-called flexible T/O, Staffing Complement, Development Complement, Career Service Grade Authorization, and other various parts is still in existence. The Development Complement does not have the same emphasis that it had originally. The Staffing Complement generally includes positions which are intended to cover total staff. Little ceiling is normally allotted to the Development Complement itself. The argument of operating officials generally is that they have a certain organization which is necessary for them to perform their functions. Over a period of time a number of these positions are going to be vacant, but, they could not be eliminated in order to transfer ceiling to the Development Complement.

The CSGA is used to control promotions. It is done by Career Service. The CSGA has all the established positions shown as a ceiling against which promotions can be made. It shows headroom by different levels based on number of positions in the Career Service minus the employees at the different grade levels slotted against these positions. As far as the flexible T/O is concerned, this system continues. Employees can be slotted to flexible positions without regard to the total. No changes in the Staffing Complement are necessary. In surveys of organizations we attempt to

S E C R E T

PART IV. I. (Cont'd)



25X1

determine what the planned incumbency is for positions at different grade levels. At that time changes are made so that organization (T/O's) established will closely fit the actual incumbency.

S E C R E T

PART IV. J.

25X1 [] Deputy Director of Personnel for Planning and Control, DD/Pers/PC) on Manpower Planning in the Aftermath of the '73 cuts. The excerpts are from Tape 44 made on 22 November 1974.

Personnel Development Plan

The PDP was aimed at one particular problem in personnel management and that was executive development whereas the Annual Personnel Plan was a much broader plan that would reflect the DDs 'look-ahead' on his personnel mix, number of people, recruitment requirements, how many people he figured he would lose in a year through separations, the planned rotations, interdirectorate rotation, if he had any. It was very similar to the Advance Staffing Plan but it included many other categories.

Mr. Colby also indicated that he had other ideas. He was concerned that the Agency systems for personnel management had been established in '52 and '53. The Career Service systems had been installed at a point in time when the Agency was expanding. It was a different time and a different situation that we had today. He (Colby) was concerned as to whether our systems were in fact responsive to the needs of today. As against the unlimited money, with unlimited head-room in the early fifties, we had just the reverse today. Colby believed that while there had been advantages and purpose in the twenty-three career services in their day that some of these very advantages had become barriers to a single Agency viewpoint. The barons, the feudal barons, had erected barriers. They were concerned only for their own situation. Colby thought the whole system deserved a good hard look. He believed we needed some centralized system, a standard system, to start moving in the direction of new approaches to personnel management within the Agency. His first efforts to come up with some kind of standardized approach had to do with

S E C R E T

PART IV. J. (Cont'd)



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planning. The PDP was launched first mainly because of the timing with the Executive Letter. Right behind it was the Annual Personnel Plan. Having launched these at that meeting (Nov 1972), the Office of Personnel and our side Plans and Control were then charged with coming up with studies and review of the way which the Agency had been operating under the career service. What some of the pros and cons were, a look at all the programs that were in operation within the career services, the policies, the practices, the techniques. After coming up with these (studies), OP was then to formalize the APP and the PDP systems and initiate them.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

PART IV. K.

25X1 [redacted] Chief, Review Staff, OP on Gaps in Manpower Planning. The excerpts are from Tape 45 made on 14 Jan 1975.

Two things seem to me to have happened in the late sixties and early seventies. One was the focus of attention on the reduction of personnel strength to a degree that it seemed that everyone considered reduction in strength as evidence in and of itself of good management. All one needed to do to be recognized as a good manager was to have the statistical curve head down instead of up. As a matter of fact this detracted from the positive attention, from the bringing in of the numbers of kinds of people who were needed. We are experiencing now the results of not having brought in enough able young people during that period. A statistic was a statistic and we were sometimes as happy to see a professional go out as we were to see a clerical employee leave or to see some military detailee return to his parent service. I think there was too much emphasis on gross number accounting and too little attention to the management problems in reducing in a way that would leave the Agency in good shape in terms of future personnel requirements.

Another thing that happened in this period (late sixties, early seventies) was the emphasis and attention on ranking as an evaluation process. This too, it seems to me, went to extremes to the point where it appeared that once you had established a rank order listing of the members of the career service you solved all your management problems. All you needed to do was to promote those at the top as rapidly as you could and dispose of those at the bottom as rapidly as you could and pay no attention to those in the middle. They would get along somehow and do what was expected of them. This was a great oversimplification of what's in-

S E C R E T

PART IV. K. (Cont'd)

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involved in career management, -- to presume that one such list would provide a ready solution to every kind of an assignment or a problem of advancement or disposition that might arise.

S E C R E T

PART IV. L.

25X1 [] Chief, Plans Staff, OP, on Manpower and Personnel Planning as directed by Wm. E. Colby. The excerpts are from Tape 51 made on 21 January 1976 after Fielder's retirement.

There were many things that Mr. Colby was talking to us daily about at this time (1973-74). After years of indifference or passive resistance to the planning notion by the front office, always more preoccupied by daily transactions than they were about tomorrow, with Mr. Colby's advent, there came a whole plethora of personnel notions for consideration and possible acceptance. Along with the idea of career development, which was one of the essentials, and improved training as a resource for accomplishing this, he placed heavy emphasis on a comprehensive personnel budgeting system which would take into account our (CIA's) personnel resources, the types of personnel needed, now and in the future, and the systematic consideration of these plans by persons in the line of command, with the advice and assistance of the Director of Personnel. It took us in the Office of Personnel -- unaccustomed to thinking in such comprehensive terms -- a little while to get straightened away in terms of what Mr. Colby's overall intentions and desires were and how we could best accommodate them.

And thus when we met with him in conference, the then Director of Personnel, Mr. Fisher, [] and myself, we tried to explain to Mr. Colby the importance of one bite at a time and maybe he should consider these elements as separate packages. He congratulated us on the work to date but indicated in no uncertain terms that what he was after was nothing less than to establish a people budget, which would actually require comprehensive consideration and evaluation by line officials of their personnel system; on a continuing basis, which could be integrated with financial budgeting in an overall management scheme, allied to Management by

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S E C R E T

PART IV. L. (Cont'd)

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Objective and certain other concepts that he was attempting to instill. It took a little time but we got the message. Out of it came the PDP (Personnel Development Plan) the Career Development Program, and the APP (Annual Personnel Plan) which was the basic personnel planning system of the components of the Agency. Had Mr. Colby not intervened, shown an active interest, led us and guided us, instead of us guiding him in the fields of personnel, I doubt very seriously if today's program would be in existence.

Re: Use of Economic Type Modeling in Manpower Planning, The excerpt is from Tape 52 made on 21 Jan 1976.

As a final thought on problems, and this falls in the category of unfinished business. I felt that little had been accomplished at the time of my retirement in the area of personnel modeling, doubtless due in part to my own inadequacy in this respect. We had made some preliminary efforts, talked to OER representatives in the Systems Unit. A monography that could put this idea into motion was actually constructed at one point in time by the OER man -- it is in the files of the Plans Staff. I felt defeatist about it recognizing the practicality of proceeding with this idea, thwarted by the lack of essential information from the computer. If the situation is now at the point where comprehensive information can be obtained from the computer, it (modeling) is not only the wave of the future but a real necessity. This development should be given a fairly high priority in the planning business. We ought to be able to develop relatively primitive estimates or retirements with some degree of accuracy. We ought to be able to play games with various possibilities, and to trace out by the use of modeling and computer data, the consequences of various alternative actions ranging from variable in-puts,

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PART IV. L. (Cont'd)

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to rates of development, or redeployment of people,
to separations of personnel, to levels of promotion.
This is not the millenium of personnel administra-
tion but is a step away from the horse and buggy
period and therefore one deserving of the earliest
practical implementation.

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

PART V. Appendices

Page

25X1 A. [] Personnel, Section II,
Staffing Para 10. Organization and
Manpower Controls 69-73

B. Comparison of Optimum and Projected
CSCS Age Distribution (CS-Clandes-
tine Services) Males GS-9 and above.
(The Hump Chart) 74

C. Retirement Chronology, 1947-68. Re-
tirement Rationale (Appendix A of
OP-4 The Development of Retirement
Policy in the CIA, 1947-68 by []
[] 75-82

25X1

25X1 D. Office of Personnel, Computer Pro-
duced Reports Handled by Statistical
Reporting Branch as of 22 September
1970. 83-85

E. Annual Personnel Plan Coverages -
FY 74/75 86

F. Distribution of Agency Personnel by
Occupational Categories, as of 31
December 1975 87

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

SECRET

APPENDIX C
Monograph No. 6

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

Appendix C.

CHRONOLOGY, 1947-68

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
14 March 1947	The first step is taken in the process of establishing a retirement policy for the Agency, although the initial concern is related to the question of which employees are eligible to participate in the Civil Service Retirement System.
2 December 1953	A Regulation is issued containing the first statement of Agency policy on retirement (in essence, this was a restatement of the applicable provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Law).
3 August 1954	The Agency announces its intention to obtain early retirement legislation.
21 March 1957	A bill is introduced in Congress providing for early retirement and other benefits for Agency Personnel.
30 April 1959	The Retirement Board concept is introduced to the CIA Career Council.
17 September 1959	The Director of Personnel recommends that the DCI approve the establishment of a Retirement Board.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

SECRET

16 October 1959 The DDP notifies his senior officers of the procedures to be followed concerning the retirement of eligible personnel.

6 November 1959 The "Hump Study" is forwarded to the DDCI together with procedures for the separation of surplus personnel.

5 January 1960 The Agency Retirement Board is established, following the approval of the DCI.

20 January 1960 The first meeting of the Agency Retirement Board is held.

26 February 1960 The DDS outlines a retirement policy for components of the Support Services.

28 August 1960 The DDI outlines his retirement policy.

23 April 1961 The Agency retirement policy is discussed in an article in the *Washington Star*.

25 May 1961 The DDI states his views on retirement policy at Career Council meeting.

3 November 1961 The Agency retirement policy is restated in

15 December 1961 The DDP requests special treatment for selected CS Careerists under CIARDS.

19 January 1962 The DDCI directs the CIA Career Council to take immediate action on the subject of obtaining early retirement legislation.

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SECRET

(Append. C. Cont'd)

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

24 January 1962 The second annual report of the Retirement Board is submitted to the Career Council.

20 October 1962 Pay Reform Act of 1962 is enacted.

4 February 1963 The Executive Secretary of the Retirement Board presents his annual report.

11 February 1963 The DDCI requests a summary of existing retirement philosophy.

27 July 1964 The Executive Director-Comptroller announces that stricter application of retirement policy shall be adopted as a measure designed to aid in meeting ceiling reductions.

24 September 1964 The DDS advises the Director of Personnel that the pronouncement of 27 July was not intended as a change of retirement policy.

14 October 1964 President Johnson signs into law the early retirement bill for CIA.

21 April 1965 The identification of employees for nomination as participants in the CIARDS is begun.

24 June 1965 establishes two Retirement Boards: one for employees under the Civil Service retirement regulations and one for employees under the CIARDS.

5 January 1966 The Annual Report of the Agency Retirement Board is issued.

15 November 1966 Procedures and responsibilities concerning the processing of cases involving eligibility for participants in CIARDS are clarified by the Executive Director-Comptroller.

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

SECRET

30 December 1966 The two retirement boards are consolidated into one.

23 February 1967 The DCI approves the revision of retirement policy which calls for the retirement of employees when they reach age 60 with 20 years of service.

29 May 1967 [redacted] are amended so as to require that extensions based on the "need-for-service" be approved by the DCI. 25X1

19 June 1967 The Retirement Counseling and Placement Staff is activated.

3 May 1968 The DCI approves recommendations on revision of Agency retirement policy.

31 October 1968 [redacted] is issued, which delineates the sense of the retirement rationale. 25X1

SECRET

(Append. C. Cont'd)

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

Appendix C.

RETIREMENT RATIONALE

(Tab A: Memo, Executive Director-Comptroller
to DCI, 30 April 1968)

1. The production of intelligence bearing on the national security for use at the highest levels of policy determination of the United States Government is a responsibility of the gravest note. The organization bearing this responsibility should be staffed with persons of the highest available intellect, integrity, professionalism, dedication, perspicacity, and dynamism. The Central Intelligence Agency's retirement policy is an essential element of its program for ensuring that its staff possesses these attributes to the highest degree feasible.

2. The personnel staffing program of the Agency is based on the concept of selective recruitment for career employment and managed career development. Selection standards are designed to accept only persons with the highest qualifications and potential for development. The Agency's development program provides a career-long blend of formal training and managed progression through appropriate assignments of increasing breadth and responsibility.

3. The goal of the Agency's development program is to place the best available employee in every position. Promotion policy reinforces career development by advancing those who excel and have the capacity for further growth. The Agency's rigorous system for evaluating the performance of its employees is designed to assure high levels of effectiveness. Those who are unsatisfactory are separated; those who are marginal or unlikely to find full career satisfaction are counseled to resign.

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(Append. C. Cont'd)

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4. Intelligence activities are characterized by continuous changes -- in requirements, methods, techniques, processes, and emphases. As these changes occur, the Agency reassigns its career staff employees and provides supplementary training as required. To the extent that these measures do not meet the needs, requisite skills, experience, and special abilities are acquired by the employment of new personnel.

5. Because there are practical limits to the size of the Agency, the requirement for new employees and the operation of the career development program cannot be accomplished without attrition. Part of this attrition is provided by involuntary separations and resignations through the Agency's system for evaluating employee performance. Other vacancies are provided by voluntary retirement and resignation and by death and disability. But together these do not create a sufficient number of vacancies.

6. The Agency's retirement policy is an integral part of its program to maintain the high level of performance required by its mission and responsibilities. It also provides the additional attrition necessary for career development and the acquisition of new employees. This policy, adopted in 1959, generally limits the career span of its employees to age 60.

7. Agency employees, with some exceptions, have all attained their career peaks several years before reaching age 60. They have had a full CIA career and have made their maximum individual contribution to their Government. Exceptions specifically contemplated are individuals who possess rare scholarship and talents that would be difficult to replace in the normal course of career development and whose retirement would not be in the best interests of the Government. In some cases retirement at 60 may result in loss of valuable experience and know-how and only generate a recruitment and training requirement.

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

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SECRET

(Append. C. (Cont'd))

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

8. It is recognized that enforcement of the policy to retire employees at age 60 occasionally subordinates the personal desires of the individual to the best interests of the Government. This is usually the case when it is necessary for any reason to separate an employee. The normal voluntary retirement age for most Federal employees is 65, and the compulsory age under the Civil Service system is 70. Similar retirement ages for CIA would result in the gradual accumulation of an excessive number of employees of declining performance, whether due to declining health, motivation, or drive or to inability to adapt to change. The effectiveness with which the Agency fulfills its extraordinary responsibilities depends entirely upon the highest possible level of effectiveness in staffing the Agency. Consequently, extraordinary action toward attaining and maintaining this goal -- such as effecting a retirement policy more stringent than that for the Federal service in general -- is warranted.

9. Retirement at age 60 may appear less appropriate for those Agency employees who are in positions that are not unique to intelligence activities. In theory, it might be possible to identify all such positions and exempt the incumbents thereof from the retirement policy.

10. There are two reasons for not doing so. Attempts to formulate criteria of differentiation would generate new problems of morale and administration. The creation of exempt categories of employees would foster odious comparisons. It would thwart the implementation of the general retirement policy indefinitely as groups and individuals pleaded their individual cases.

11. The more fundamental reason for not exempting certain categories of Agency employees is that the work of the Agency must be performed with utmost responsiveness. This requires a general state of mind on the part of all employees that timeliness is critical, accuracy is imperative, and absorption with the

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task at hand takes priority over personal distractions. Advancing years inevitably bring about a lessening of work vigor and enthusiasm. The larger the proportion of older employees, the greater the debilitating effects on the tenor of the Agency.

12. In summary, the age 60 retirement policy is a key element of the Agency's efforts to attain excellence in its staffing. Without the policy the entire personnel program of the Agency would be impaired. The most vigorous and productive individuals, finding themselves stymied, will leave the service or will never be persuaded to enter in the first place. By shortening the career span of all employees, service in intelligence will continue to be highly attractive to outstanding young men and women. In the end, our national intelligence objectives will be best served.

25X1

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Statistical Reporting Branch

Agency Grade Distribution by Office	Monthly
" " " by SD	Quarterly
" " " Location	"
Agency Selected Changes (Ceiling & In process)	Monthly
Agency on duty strength	"
Assignment of Support Career Service Personnel	Quarterly
Bi Weekly Ceiling Status Report	Bi-weekly
Career Service Grade Authorization	Monthly
Career Training Program Separations	Quarterly
Civilian & Military Departmental on duty Strength	Monthly
Civilian & Military Details Who EOD'd	Weekly
Civilian & Military Details Who Separated	"
Clandestine Service Grade Distribution	Monthly
Clandestine Service Gains and Losses	"
Clandestine Service Separations	"
Characteristics of On Duty Professional Staff Personnel	Quarterly
Combined Civilian & Military Personnel Status Report (Over/Under Ceiling)	Monthly
Combined Civilian & Military Personnel Status Report	"
Credit Union Report of Agency Re-hires	"
Difference Between Agency On Duty Strength and Authorized FY 1971 Ceiling	"
Eyes Only Combined Civilian & Military Status Report	"
Fitness Report Ratings	Annual
Married Couples Employed in Agency	"
Minority Group Study	"
Non-Ceiling Personnel Categories	Quarterly
Office of Personnel On Duty Strength	Weekly
OPRED Country Strength Report	Quarterly
Personnel Strength Quarterly Statistical Review (Abbreviated)	Quarterly
Photostats (Agency Strength Tables	Monthly
Placement Progress Charts	Monthly
Quality Step Increase by SD	Fiscal Year
Quality Step Increase by Office	"
Quarterly Gains and Losses	Monthly
Recruiter's Codes	Unscheduled
Report on Federal Women Employees in Higher Positions	Annual
S-I-R Reports (Positions & Employees Other than D SD Assigned to DDP Offices	Monthly
SD-SS Staff Personnel Grade Distribution	"

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500190001-1

FrequencySRB, continued

	Monthly
Supergrade Status Changes	"
Support Service s Staff Personnel GS-14 and above	"
Security Cancellations & Civilian Accessions	Annual
Separations - Factor - Office	"
Separations - Office	"
Civilian Separations - Factor - SD	"
Separations - SD - Grade	"
Data on Where Separations Are Going from CIA	"
Promotions - SD - Grade	"
Promotions - Office - Grade	"
On Duty - SD - Grade	"
Civilian Gains & Losses - Office	"
Accessions - Office - Grade	"
Accessions - SD - Grade	"
On Duty - Office - Grade	"
Grade Distribution - Office - FY	"
Promotion Rates - SD - Grade - FY	"
Grade Distribution - SD - FY	"

TOTAL REPORTS

55

Coverages

APPENDIX E

I. ON DUTY STRENGTH STATISTICS

FY 74 Goals and FY 74 Achievements
Overall Plans for Projected Changes - FY 75
On Duty Strength Report - By Category

II. MANPOWER ANALYSIS

Desired Staff Personnel Gains
Professional Gains
Desired Alterations or Significant Changes
Rotation of GS Professional Employees
Movement of Clerical/Technical Employees to Professional Status
Utilization of Stenographers
Planned Lateral Entry of Professional Personnel
Personal Rank Assignments
Number of Consultants and Reemployed Annuitants
Separation:
 (1) Voluntary Retirees
 (2) Involuntary

III. TRAINING

Desired Core, Skill and External Training Enrollments
Language Skills Enrollment
Language Skills Development

IV. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

Professional Employees
 Women Staffing and Promotion
 Black Staffing and Promotion
 Other Racial Minority Staffing and Promotion

Technical Employees
 Women Staffing and Promotion
 Black Staffing and Promotion
 Other Racial Minority Staffing and Promotion

Movement of Clerical/Technical to Professional Status
Blacks, Other Racial Minorities, Women

Enrollment in Core, Skill and External Training --
Professional Employees (EEO)

Core Courses Specified in EEO Objectives

25X1

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	Management, Organization at al	
	Recruitment	25X1
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LOCATION:
HS/HC 906 ✓

ABSTRACT A chronology of highlights by topics covering the 701 Program, Schlesinger Slash...(how it was made), Retirement, Career Service, Manpower, and Organization over the years. There are also excerpts from tapes of the Oral History Program, arranged by topics...those include Wm. Kelly, George Meloon, L.K.White, [redacted], Gordon Stewart, Emmett Echols, Robert Wattles, Harry Fisher, [redacted]

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